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DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGY AND COMMON LAW
LAWMAKING: A BRIEF ANALYSIS OF A&M
RECORDS, INC. v NAPSTER, INC.
MICHAEL W. CARROLL*
My role in this Symposium is to analyze the decisions rendered
thus far in A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster.1 I will focus primarily on
the Ninth Circuit's decision and identify some of the implications
these decisions will have on copyright law in the Internet context.2
In particular, I will highlight changes in the law made by the court's
treatment of vicarious and contributory copyright infringement.
Before turning to the court's opinion let me set the stage.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Copyright Law
1. Legal Responses to New Technologies
In the Twentieth Century, the story of copyright law has been
one featuring a series of business-to-business arrangements worked
out among industry representatives and enacted by Congress, with a
little fine-tuning along the way.3 As a result, copyright law has be-
come quite complex and much of the Copyright Act of 1976 ("Cop-
yright Act") reads like a very finely detailed contract. 4
Many of these industry arrangements have been reached after
new technologies for reproducing, performing, or distributing
copyrighted works have entered the marketplace.5 When cable tel-
evision began to expand beyond its role of providing traditional
community access television and began importing distant broadcast
* Assistant Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law. This article
is an edited, and substantially extended, transcript of my panel presentation, given
on March 10, 2001, while I was an attorney in the Washington, D.C. office of
Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering. I extend thanks to Colin Rushing for commenting on
portions of this article, and to my family for their support in my transition to the
academy.
1. 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000) ("Napster I"), affgin part, rev'g in part,
239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) ("Napster II").
2. Three weeks prior to the date of this symposium the Ninth Circuit handed
down its decision in Napster. See generally 239 F.3d 1004.
3. See generally Jessica Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68
OR. L. REv. 275 (1989) (exploring process of drafting copyright legislation).
4. See id. at 279.
5. See id. at 328.
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signals and attracting investment capital, television broadcasters
perceived a potential competitor.6 As with the recording industry's
view of Napster, television broadcasters, movie studios and owners
of music copyrights took the view that cable companies were trying
to build a business using their intellectual property.7 These parties
looked for a theory of copyright infringement that would give them
the right to enjoin cable television's retransmission of their
programming. 8
In copyright terms, a broadcast is a public performance of the
copyrighted work, and the copyright owner is given the exclusive
right to publicly perform audio-visual works.9 Copyright owners
took the position that when cable television stations retransmitted
broadcast programming, they were engaged in new, unauthorized
public performances of the works. 10 Cable systems argued that they
were merely passing along a performance that had been sent into
the airwaves for all to enjoy.1 The Supreme Court rejected the
copyright owners' position. 12 The Supreme Court, however, aware
that a major revision of the Copyright Act was gaining momentum
on Capitol Hill, invited Congress to revisit the statute to consider
whether cable system operators should have to pay a royalty for re-
transmitting broadcast programming.13
The copyright owners persuaded Congress to treat the retrans-
mission of a public performance as a new public performance,
which, if unauthorized, would infringe their rights. The price for
extending that entitlement, however, was a statutory license codi-
fied in section 111 of the Copyright Act. 14 Congress imposed the
statutory license to reduce the transaction costs involved in clearing
rights to broadcast programming and to deprive television broad-
casters of the ability to stifle the development of cable television by
6. See id.
7. See id. at 327-28.
8. See Litman, supra note 3, at 328.
9. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994 & Supp. V 1999); 17 U.S.C. § 1 (repealed 1976).
10. See Litman, supra note 3, at 327.
11. See id. at 327-28.
12. See id. at 329.
13. See Teleprompter Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 415 U.S. 394, 414 (1974) (holding
determination of best alternative structure for providing compensation to copy-
right holders beyond competence of court); see also Fortnightly Corp. v. United
Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 401 (1968) (holding accommodation of vari-
ous competing considerations of copyright is for Congress to decide); Litman,
supra note 3, at 330-31 n.304 (describing disruptive effect of Teleprompter on pend-
ing legislative negotiations).
14. See 17 U.S.C. § 111 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (noting requirements to enti-
tlement of statutory license).
[Vol. 9: p. 5
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withholding programming. 15 As the cable industry grew, it was tele-
vision broadcasters who sought protection from Congress, which
obliged by imposing "must carry" rules on cable system operators.1 6
A similar, though very complicated, combination of litigation and
legislation has yielded similar results for direct broadcast satellite
retransmission of broadcast television programming.' 7
An important point to recall is that the Supreme Court
adopted a reading of the Copyright Act of 1909 that favored public
access to programming delivered by cable systems.' 8 In doing so,
the Supreme Court chose not to fashion a judicial compromise
and, instead, established a baseline favorable to new technologies
for legislative negotiations. In Napster, the Ninth Circuit was of-
fered a similar opportunity, but chose a different course by holding
Napster liable under a hybrid theory of vicarious liability and de-
clining to use judicial power to create a compulsory license.19
2. Copyrights in Music
Negotiations over copyright rights in music arguably have been
as complex as those involving broadcast programming. Indeed, the
lengthiest sections of the Copyright Act are those concerning rights
in music. These sections of the Copyright Act are lengthy because
of the large number of copyright owners and the number of indus-
tries with an interest in music rights. The number of copyright
owners is a function of the number of composers who retain some
interest in their copyrights. The Copyright Act recognizes two
copyrights in recorded music. The first is in the underlying musical
work, including lyrics, and the second is in the recorded rendition
of the musical work.20 Any arrangement for distributing copies of
15. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 88-98 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5702-13 (providing principal legislative history of 17 U.S.C. § 111); see also
Litman, supra note 3, at 331-32 (describing process that produced § 111).
16. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Fed. Comms. Comm'n, 520 U.S. 180, 213
(1997) (discussing and holding constitutional "must-carry" provisions).
17. See 17 U.S.C. § 119 (1994 & Supp. V 1999); see also 17 U.S.C. § 122 (1994
& Supp. V 1999) (explaining satellite broadcasters have two statutory licenses to
retransmit broadcast programming).
18. See Litman, supra note 3, at 330-31 (discussing Supreme Court decision in
Teleprompter).
19. See Alfred C. Yen, A Preliminary Economic Analysis of Napster: Internet Technol-
ogy, Copyright Liability, and the Possibility of Coasean Bargaining, 26 U. DAYrON L. REv.
247, 274-77 (2001) (arguing Ninth Circuit should have refrained from enjoining
Napster).
20. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (noting musical lyrics can be
both part of musical work and independent literary work, and in either case, exclu-
sive rights given to author are same).
2002]
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recorded music requires a means of acquiring rights from both sets
of copyright owners. Aggregating distribution and reproduction
rights is administratively difficult, particularly with respect to musi-
cal works, because the class of copyright owners is large.
The class of copyright owners in sound recordings is currently
small, but has the potential to proliferate. Under current practices,
ownership of sound recording copyrights is highly concentrated in
companies owned by the five largest record companies, who collec-
tively sell approximately eighty-five percent of the recorded music
sold in the United States. 21 These companies are the principal
plaintiffs in Napster and it is their ownership of hundreds of
thousands of sound recording copyrights that gives them standing
to sue for copyright infringement.2 2 The "Big Five" record compa-
nies obtain ownership in the sound recording copyrights by form-
ing contracts with the recording artists. The precise copyright
status of this contractual transfer is contested by the record compa-
nies and recording artists. 23 But practices may change, and if the
recording artists' interpretation of the Copyright Act prevails, the
class of sound recording copyright owners will grow substantially
within the next fifteen years.
The number of industries with an interest in music also is sub-
stantial. These industries include all those involved in music pro-
duction and distribution, including radio, television, cable, satellite,
live theater, brick-and-mortar retailers, online retailers, bars, restau-
21. See Don Clark & Martin Peers, Can the Record Industry Beat Free Web Music?,
WALL ST. J., June 20, 2000, at BI (explaining "Big Five" record companies are
Sony, Universal Music, Warner Music, EMI and BMG Entertainment).
22. See 17 U.S.C. § 501 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (authorizing owner of exclu-
sive rights to sue for copyright infringement).
23. See PeterJ. Strand, What a Short Strange Trip It's Been: Sound Recordings and
the Work Made For Hire Doctrine, ENTER. & SPORTS LAWYER, Fall 2000, at 12 (describ-
ing amendments to definition of work made for hire). In a recent legislative deba-
cle, Congress passed a bill designed to make only "technical corrections" to recent
copyright legislation but which also added sound recordings to the list of works
that were eligible for treatment as works made for hire under 17 U.S.C. § 101(b).
See id. The effect was to resolve without debate a contentious issue within the in-
dustry over ownership of sound recording copyrights. See id. A number of major
recording artists responded vociferously, and, within the same session of Congress,
the statute was amended again to delete sound recordings from the work-for-hire
definition. See id.
The issue has periodically popped up on the judicial radar screen. See Ballas v.
Tedesco, 41 F. Supp. 2d 531, 541 (D.N.J. 1999); Staggers v. Real Authentic Sound,
77 F. Supp. 2d 57, 64 (D.D.C. 1999) (sound recordings not with classes of works set
forth in § 101(b)). As of this writing, a group of musicians has filed a motion in
Napster seeking resolution of this issue. See Musicians File Brief Supporting Napster,
ZDNET NEws AUSTRALIA, Nov. 14, 2001, at http://www.zdnet.com.au/newstech/
ebusiness/story/0,2000024981,20261852,00.htm.
[Vol. 9: p. 5
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rants, and the list goes on. If all the interested parties in these in-
dustries had to clear rights with all of the interested copyright
owners through individualized negotiations, the transaction costs
could potentially thwart the creation of any effective means of dis-
tributing music. In response, Congress has crafted a series of statu-
tory licenses related to music that permit the production,
performance or distribution of music in certain circumstances with-
out ex ante negotiation. 24 The licenses, on the other hand, require
that those using copyrighted music contribute to a copyright "kitty"
administered by the U.S. Copyright Office. Rights holders are to
negotiate over how the kitty is to be divided and, if the negotiations
break down, the Copyright Office oversees an arbitration
proceeding.
Although the system has been far from perfect, prior to the rise
of the Internet and the MP3 format, the music industry had re-
solved the more glaring collective action issues and had attained a
tenuously stable method of music production and distribution
under the Copyright Act of 1976. Rapid technological advances,
however, have disrupted traditional arrangements within the indus-
try. The advance that poses the longest-term challenge is the
spread of distributed computing technology that partially underlies
the Napster system.
B. Technological Background
1. Digital Music and the Rise of MP3
Napster is a computer application and related service founded
on a technology known as distributed computing or, more fashiona-
bly, peer-to-peer ("P2P") communication. The technology is dis-
ruptive to distribution schemes dependent on bottlenecks, which
almost by definition can be exclusively controlled. Napster oper-
ates with one bottleneck, and it is that feature that led the Ninth
Circuit to hold Napster liable for the infringing activities of its
users.
Although Napster spread across the Internet faster than wild-
fire, the technological developments that led to Napster's creation
were quite gradual compared to other advances in the computing
field. Digital audio recording is done through pulse-code modula-
tion ("PCM"), by which a sound wave is sampled in millisecond in-
crements. For most audio compact discs ("CDs"), the sampling rate
24. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 112, 114, 115 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
2002]
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is 47,000 times per second.25 Each sample is encoded with a digital
value - a unique set of zeros and ones. The code is stored on mag-
netic tape and then transferred to any other medium capable of
storing digital information, most notably CDs.
PCM was discovered in the late 1930s by an engineer in con-
nection with his work in the growing telecommunications indus-
try.2 6 The technology to store digital data on a magnetic drum was
developed in the late 1930s to early 1940s and, with the help of
captured German magnetophones, was further refined by Engi-
neering Research Associates while working on encryption research
for the Navy.27 Beginning in the 1960s, Philips-Siemens, owner of
the Polygram record label (one of the Big Five, now part of the
Universal Music Group), experimented with PCM and optical disks.
This experimentation led to the production of the first compact
disc player in 1979.28 Sony soon followed introducing its first CD
player in 1983.29
The key fact about the development of CD technology is that
the recording companies relied on the architectural features of the
file size and the disk to protect against unauthorized copying.
Throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s, limitations in computing
power made it seem unlikely to most that the very large amount of
data contained on an average compact disc, up to 680 megabytes,
could be extracted and copied without expensive equipment. This
apparent limitation meant that the threat of unauthorized copying,
a threat not any different from the threat of unauthorized repro-
duction of vinyl long-playing records, would be limited to commer-
cial operations. Moreover, CD players were built to read the data
on a compact disc, but they did not have the ability to copy the
data.
As we now know, the recording industry's faith in these archi-
tectural limitations was misplaced. A group of engineers, the Mo-
25. See MICHAEL FINK, INSIDE THE Music BUSINESS: MUSIC IN CONTEMPORARY
LIFE 73-75 (1989).
26. See Steven E. Schoenherr, The Digital Revolution: Digital Audio Recording For-
mats Compared, at http://history.acusd.edu/gen/recording/digital.html (explain-
ing how Alec H. Reeves, who worked for International Telephone & Telegraph
Company in France, disclosed his PCM invention in a French patent in 1938, a
British patent in 1939 and U.S. Patent #2,272,070 in 1942).
27. See id. "The magnetic drum designed by ERA would be used in the com-
puters built in the U.S. over the next years by Harvard, IBM, Remington Rand,
National Security Administration, National Bureau of Standards." Id.
28. See RUSSELL SANJEK, PENNIES FROM HEAVEN: THE AMERICAN POPULAR MusIc
BUSINESS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 612-13 (1996).
29. See id. at 613.
[Vol. 9: p. 5
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tion Picture Experts Group ("MPEG"), working under United
Nations' auspices as part of the International Standards Organiza-
tion, carried out its mission to develop a standard for the compres-
sion of video and audio data. 30 For audio compression, MPEG
identified certain frequencies that were inaudible to the human
ear. Using algorithms based on a psychoacoustic model, MPEG de-
veloped a compression standard that would encode sounds in a way
that preserves quality to the listener when decoded, while requiring
considerably less storage space than used on a compact disc.31 Of
the audio codecs (short for compression/decompression) MPEG
developed, the one most familiar is MPEG-1, Audio Layer 3 or MP3.
The development of MP3 was one of a confluence of factors
that greatly reduced the architectural barriers to easy, unauthorized
reproduction of music files stored on CDs. In addition to the devel-
opment of the MP3 format and decoding software (MP3 players),
personal computers increased in power, CD-ROM drives were
deployed in most personal computers and the Internet expanded
rapidly. The development of audio extraction software, called rip-
pers, freed the music files from their discs and made it possible for
these files to travel the globe. With widespread expenditure of time
and effort, many individuals moved large amounts of their music
libraries from their CD collection to their personal computers.
2. Arrival of Napster
The growth and expansion of such technological advances led
to file swapping by electronic mail, through FTP sites, and the post-
ing of some MP3 files on the Internet. But, the number of files
remained limited so that the only remaining barrier to widespread
unauthorized copying was the difficulty in finding music files on
the Internet. The most common way to make files available on the
Internet was to store them on servers linked to the Internet. Many
individuals who had ripped music files from their CDs did not have
the will or opportunity to publish the files to the Internet in the
traditional client-server model.
Then, a student at Northeastern University, named Shawn Fan-
ning, along with some friends, developed an elegantly simple client-
side application with back-end server software that allowed anyone
30. See Moving Picture Experts Group (MPEG), Who We Are, at http://
mpeg.telecomitalialab.com/who we-are.htm (describing makeup of MPEG).
31. See D. Thom et. al., MPEG Audio FAQ Version 9 MPEG-] and MPBG-2 BC, at
http://mpeg.telecomitalialab.com/faq/mpl-aud/mpl-aud.htm#8 (describing
how MPEG works).
2002]
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running the client application to search a dynamic directory listing
files available on other Napster users' hard drives. 32 The client-side
application is called MusicShare, and is freely available for
download at http://www.napster.com.33 To use MusicShare, a user
must register with Napster. Once the user has registered, Music-
Share permits the user to connect to a dynamic directory hosted on
Napster servers. The directory lists music files in the MP3 format
available for download from the hard drives of other Napster users
who are currently connected to the Napster service. MusicShare
allows users to search the directory by file name or by artist. In
addition, a user can create a "hotlist," that allows the user to search
the files made available by specific Napster users. When a user
clicks on a file in the directory to download, the file is copied from
one user's computer to the other user's computer over the In-
ternet. Napster does not make copies of the files. Rather, each
Napster user acts as both a client and a server. In other words, the
machines connected to the Napster service act as peers, bringing
distributed computing to the masses. On its website, Napster por-
trayed its peer-to-peer technology as the basis for creating a new
kind of musical community. To the recording industry, that "com-
munity" was more like a den of thieves.
3. Prelude to a Lawsuit
While certain members of the entertainment industry sought
to portray Napster, Inc. and its founders as evil incarnate, a number
of other musicians and copyright owners had a more ambivalent, or
even positive, reaction to the rampant file sharing that had taken
the Internet by storm. Some bands, for example, were gaining un-
precedented notoriety.3 4 Songs that were on out-of-print records
resurfaced. Counter to those who claimed that file sharing would
destroy record sales, CD sales had increased over pre-Napster levels.
Indeed, a compilation of hits from the Beatles was released in No-
vember 2000, and promptly shot to number one on the Billboard
32. See Giacario Varanini, Q&A: Napster Creator Shawn Fanning, ZDNET NEws,
Mar. 3, 2000, at http://www.zdnet.com/zdnn/stories/news/0,4586,2455495,00.
html (interviewing Shawn Fanning, whose nickname was "Napster").
33. See OldVersion.com, at http://www.oldversion.com/napster.shtml (provid-
ing prior versions of MusicShare because, as of this writing, MusicShare no longer
is available for download from Napster site).
34. See Richard Menta, Did Napster Take Radiohead's New Album to Number 1,
MP3 NEWSWRE.NET, Oct. 28, 2000, at http://www.mp3newswire.net/stories/2000/
radiohead.html (noting that Radiohead, which makes intelligent, non-standard
pop music that does not generally top charts, saw its album Kid A, released on
Napster prior to its official release, shoot to number one).
[Vol. 9: p. 5
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charts and sold 2.5 million copies in its first month, notwithstand-
ing the fact that all of the songs on the album were readily available
on Napster before the album's release.
35
But, without a doubt, file sharing on Napster has resulted in
some displaced sales. And, as more people purchase CD burners or
portable MP3 players, devices that make digital music increasingly
portable, the prospect for a greater diminution of sales seems al-
most certain. Thus, as was widely expected, Napster got sued ...
and sued . . . and sued. Metallica, Dr. Dre and all of the major
recording labels sued Napster. Virtually all the major players in the
recording industry sued Napster. Although a few artists sued Nap-
ster, the principal plaintiffs were those who own interests in the
sound recording copyrights in recorded music. Yet, the people en-
gaged in the copying and distribution of the music files are individ-
ual Napster users. Napster, Inc. does not host copies of any music
files on its servers, which means that it does not directly infringe
any of the copyright owners' exclusive rights. But the copyright
owners did not want to sue individual users, who also were fans and
customers, even though it has been individual users who have been
directly responsible for the unauthorized reproduction and distri-
bution of copyrighted music.
Therefore,just as broadcasters and other copyright owners had
done with cable television, record labels began to inquire into
which legal theories could de used to shut down the service. Inter-
estingly, notwithstanding the highly political nature of copyright
law and the numerous amendments that copyright owners have ob-
tained to strengthen their respective hands in litigation, no provi-
sion in the Copyright Act specifically provides a cause of action
against third parties who facilitate copyright infringement. For
years, however, courts have recognized third-party liability for copy-
right infringement. 36 Over time, these theories have been de-
scribed doctrinally as "contributory infringement" and "vicarious
infringement. '37 To prevail on either of these theories, the plaintiff
must first prove that the defendant is aiding a party that has, or is,
35. See David Basham, Beatles Get Back to #1, MTV NEWS, Dec. 13, 2000, at
http://www.mtv.com/news/articles/1424531/20001213/story.jhtml (explaining
Beatles rise to top of Billboard charts).
36. See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 435 (1984)
(recognizing third-party liability for copyright infringement). As a formal matter,
the theories of third-party liability arguably reflect interpretation of 17 U.S.C.
§ 501 (a)'s imposition of liability on "anyone who violates any of the exclusive
rights of the copyright owner," but as a practical matter, the theories are better
understood as federal common law. Id. at 433.
37. See Demetriades v. Kaufmann, 690 F. Supp. 289, 292 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
2002]
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engaged in direct copyright infringement. In Napster, for example,
the record labels had to prove that individual users were infringers,
and thus the rights of millions of Napster users were decided in
abstentia.
The absence of individual defendants from the lawsuit is prob-
lematic for two reasons. First, the people who were directly respon-
sible for the alleged wrong were not called upon to account for
their conduct. This failure to hold individuals accountable is prob-
lematic in terms of the interaction between legal norms and social
norms and the ongoing negotiation over intellectual property
rights and responsibilities in the digital era. Second, had individual
Napster users been present and had they advanced their own fair
use claims, the courts would have been forced to engage in a more
nuanced analysis. Overall, however, the outcome would not have
been much different had any individual users been sued. Individ-
ual Napster users could have participated as amici or could have
volunteered to be joined as defendants (an unlikely proposition),
and Napster had considerable incentives to assert the rights of its
users because a defendant to a claim of third party liability is enti-
tled to assert any defenses available to the alleged direct infringer.
II. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.
A. Summary
The Ninth Circuit's analysis tracked the parties' arguments.38
Adjudicating the rights of the absent Napster users, the court first
held that users of the Napster system who upload and download
copies of music files infringe the copyrights owned by music pub-
lishers and record companies. 39 Second, using Napster either to
"sample" new music or to "space-shift" music from their CDs to
their computers is not protected by the Copyright Act's fair use pro-
vision. 40 These holdings rely, in part, on a finding that the massive
scale of file exchange enabled by Napster constitutes a "commer-
cial" use of the copyrighted works, notwithstanding the fact that no
money changes hands among users of the Napster service.41
In Napster, the court held that Napster is not legally responsible
for the infringing activities of its users merely because it has sup-
plied software and operates a computer system that is capable of
38. See generally Napster II, 239 F. 3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
39. See id. at 1018-19.
40. See id.
41. See id. at 1021.
[Vol. 9: p. 5
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facilitating the unauthorized copying of copyrighted works.42 In re-
affirming and extending the Supreme Court's holding in Sony Corp.
v. Universal Studios, Inc., the Ninth Circuit held that when a software
or computer system is capable of "substantial non-infringing uses,"
the distributor or operator of such a system must have specific
knowledge that the software or system is being used for infringing
purposes before the distributor or operator can be held liable. 43
The court affirmed the district court's finding that Napster had suf-
ficient actual knowledge of infringement such that it is likely to be
found liable. 44
The court further held that, because Napster had reserved the
right to deny users access to the service and had the ability to search
its directory of file names, Napster had an obligation to police its
system. 45 Because Napster users name their own files,46 Napster's
duty to police is limited to searching its index of file names to de-
tect titles of copyrighted music. 47 The court implied that Napster's
obligation is to block access to all the files of a user who posts copy-
righted music rather than just access to the files containing copy-
righted music.
Finally, the court rejected two of Napster's statutory defenses.
First, the court held inapplicable a provision of the Audio Home
Recording Act.48 The Audio Home Recording Act immunizes the
manufacturer of a "digital audio recording device" or a "digital au-
dio recording medium" to the extent that such device or medium is
used noncommercially by consumers to make copies.49 Second, the
court declined to decide whether Napster was eligible for a safe har-
bor from monetary liability for search engines set forth in the On-
line Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act. 50
42. See id.
43. See Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1021.
44. See id. at 1020.
45. See id. at 1023-24.
46. See id. at 1024.
47. See id.
48. See Napster I, 239 F.3d at 1024; see also 17 U.S.C. § 1008 (1994 & Supp. V
1999) ("We agree with the district court that the Audio Home Recording Act does
not cover the downloading of MP3 files to computer hard drives.").
49. See id.
50. See id. at 1024; see also 17 U.S.C. § 512(d) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). This
section was enacted as part of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA") in
1998. See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
2002]
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B. Direct Infringement
The Ninth Circuit had little difficulty upholding the district
court's finding that individual Napster users were engaged in direct
copyright infringement of the plaintiffs' rights of public distribu-
tion and reproduction. 51 According to the court, users who sign on
to Napster and invite anyone to copy files are publicly distributing
or authorizing the public distribution of that work.52 Additionally,
when a user asks (in binary code) to copy a song file, the user in-
fringes the copyright owner's right of reproduction. Having found
a prima facie case of direct infringement, the court addressed
51. See Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1014.
52. See id. The Ninth Circuit's holding on infringement of the distribution
right requires greater explication in light of the text of the Copyright Act. Accord-
ing to the Act, "the owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to
do and to authorize any of the following: ... (3) to distribute copies or pho-
norecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of owner-
ship, or by rental, lease, or lending." 17 U.S.C. § 106. The Court held simply that,
"Napster users who upload file names to the search index for others to copy violate
plaintiff's distribution rights." Napster I, 239 F.3d at 1014 (emphasis added).
Uploading a file name is not a distribution of a phonorecord by sale or other
transfer of ownership. And, as the court acknowledges, the copy that is "distrib-
uted" is made by the Napster user requesting the file.
Perhaps the court meant that those Napster users who permit others to re-
quest copies of data from their hard drives are distributing phonorecords without
authorization. Such distributions, however, may not involve a "sale or other trans-
fer of ownership" because, arguably, the alleged distributor never had an owner-
ship interest in the copy received by the requesting user. See David L. Hayes,
Advanced Copyright Issues on the Internet, 7 TEX. INT. PROP. L.J. 1, 37 (1998). If this
understanding of digital mitosis is correct, then the copyright owner's right to au-
thorize "rental, lease, or lending" also would not be infringed because the three
uses are defined by retention of an ownership interest in the copy.
Numerous other courts have held that one who exposes a file to the Internet
or to subscribers of a bulletin board system is liable for distributing any infringing
copies made by those requesting the file. See, e.g., Marobie-FL, Inc. v. Nat'l Ass'n of
Fire Equip., 983 F. Supp. 1167, 1173 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Playboy Enters., Inc. v.
Webbworld, Inc., 991 F. Supp. 543, 550-53 (N.D. Tex. 1997); Playboy Enters., Inc.
v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1555-59 (M.D. Fla. 1993). But the most thoughtful
early decision was skeptical. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom Online Comm.
Serv., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1371-72 (N.D. Cal. 1995) ("[O]nly the subscriber should
be liable for causing the distribution of plaintiffs' work, as the contributing actions
of the BBS provider are automatic and indiscriminate.").
Like these courts, the Ninth Circuit stretched the definition of the distribu-
tion right to keep the right meaningful in the digital age. The courts could have
accepted the fact that because digital technology operates by making multiple cop-
ies, the reproduction right has displaced the distribution right in many contexts.
In Napster, as in the cases just cited, the court could have, and perhaps should
have, held that one who exposes a file to the Internet, so that others may make
infringing copies of the file, is liable as a contributory infringer of the copyright
owner's right of reproduction. The Napster users who make files available know or
should know that others will copy the files and exposing the files to other Napster
users for such purpose is a material contribution to the making of such copies.
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whether Napster users were engaged in fair use of the plaintiffs'
copyrighted works.53
C. Fair Use
Napster argued that its users were making fair use of the music
available on its system. 54 Its first asserted fair use was "sampling."55
In essence Napster argued,
Look . . . what are people doing? They're not really re-
placing sales; they just want to see what's out there, right?
This is the most exciting new development in music distri-
bution in all time. Suddenly all the music in the world,
practically, is available at your fingertips. No more rifling
through the bins in the used record store to find this out
of print music, it's right there, push a button and you've
got it. So people are sampling music. They're just
downloading it to listen to it, then they're going to go out
and buy it. No harm to the market, it's fair use.56
Napster also argued that its users were merely space-shifting music
they already owned.57 In particular, Napster argued that people
who owned CDs, but did not have the hardware and software neces-
sary to convert the files on their CDs into the MP3 format, used the
Napster service as a means to do So. 5 8
Fair use analysis turns on a number of factors: (1) the purpose
and character of the use, (2) the nature of the use, (3) the portion
of the copyrighted work used and (4) the effect on the market for
the copyrighted work.59 Normally, courts address how an asserted
use fares under these factors. In this case, neither the district court
nor the appellate court began by addressing the asserted uses
under these factors. 60 Rather, the mode of analysis employed by
both courts reflects the problematic aspects of having allowed Nap-
53. See Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1014.
54. See id.
55. See id. at 1018.
56. See id.
57. See id. at 1019 ("Napster also maintains that space-shifting is a fair use.").
58. See Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1019. Napster also advanced as a third fair use
the authorized distribution of new artists' music through the Napster service that
the plaintiffs did not seek to enjoin. See id. As a matter of clarification, if the
distribution is authorized, it is not a fair use, it is a non-infringing use because it is
not even prima facie infringing. See id.
59. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (listing factors used in fair use
analysis).
60. See Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1015-17; Napster 1, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 912-13.
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ster to act as a proxy for all of its users with regard to their fair use
rights. Both courts applied the four factors to the Napster service
in the aggregate and then to the specific asserted fair uses of sampling
and space-shifting. 61
Under the first factor, the Ninth Circuit found that the pur-
pose and character of file sharing was commercial notwithstanding
the fact that no money changes hands among Napster users. 62 The
court observed that "[dlirect economic benefit is not required to
demonstrate a commercial use. Rather, repeated and exploitative
copying of copyrighted works, even if the copies are not offered for
sale, may constitute a commercial use."6 3 Under the second factor,
the court found that because the copyrighted works were creative,
the copyrights were thick and entitled to robust protection. 64
Under the third factor, the court held that the portion of the copy-
righted works generally copied by users were the whole works.65
Under the fourth factor, both courts held that Napster's use, in the
aggregate, harmed the market for CD sales among college students
and acted as a barrier to entry into the new market for digital
downloads. 66
Turning to the asserted fair uses, the district court and the
Ninth Circuit used their respective analyses of aggregate Napster
use to color their respective analyses of the asserted fair uses. "Sam-
pling" appears to have been understood to mean any download
made with the intent to consider the purchase of a song, either as a
single or bundled with other songs on a CD. Both courts under-
stood "sampling" use to include a user's retaining a copy of an MP3
file even after the user has decided not to purchase the song. 67
With that understanding, the Ninth Circuit upheld Judge Patel's
determination that sampling was a commercial use presumed to
harm the market because record companies regulate the availability
of promotional free copies and charge Internet sites for use of pro-
61. See Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1015-17; Napster , 114 F. Supp. 2d at 912-13
62. See Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1018.
63. Id.; cf 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (defining "financial gain" to
"include[ ] receipt, or expectation of receipt, of anything of value, including the
receipt of other copyrighted works").
64. See Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1016 (citing Napster , 114 F. Supp. 2d at 913).
65. See id.
66. See id. at 1016-17 (citing Napsterl, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 913-15).
67. See id. at 1018 ("Napster users download a full, free and permanent copy
of the recording."); Napster I, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 913 ("[S]ampling on Napster
amounts to obtaining permanent copies of songs that users would otherwise have
to purchase. .. ").
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motional samples.68 In the alternative, the court held that even if
sampling is non-commercial, the fact that users could retain a "sam-
pled" copy of music permanently harmed the markets for CDs and
for digital downloads.69 Finally, the court brushed aside Napster's
argument that it did not harm the market because Napster use actu-
ally increased CD sales. Specifically, the court held that even if CD
sales increased, the copyright holder is entitled to determine how
to increase sales. 70
The Ninth Circuit also quickly dismissed space-shifting as a fair
use.71 The court appeared to understand "space-shifting" as involv-
ing two different activities, but did not clarify how each was not a
fair use. At first, the court said "[s] pace-shifting occurs when a Nap-
ster user downloads MP3 music files in order to listen to music he
already owns on audio CD."'72 Presumably, this description means
downloading an MP3 file from another Napster user's computer.
The court also appeared to understand space-shifting to involve a
Napster user making his or her own ripped files available on Nap-
ster so that he or she could access the files from another machine.7 3
This understanding is an unlikely understanding of space-shifting
because it would require the user to have his or her home machine
turned on and connected to Napster when he or she tried to access
the files from a remote machine. In either case, the court held this
use to be infringement because the use involved making the files
available to the world and permitting other users to copy the files.7 4
Both courts' analyses of fair use could have been more careful.
Neither court started by addressing how Napster users use the ser-
vice. 75 The evidence appears to show that Napster is many things to
many people. In the context of this case, Napster raised the fair use
defenses of its users that it thought might best shield it from liabil-
ity. This approach, however, left some uses by some users
unanalyzed. Even with the asserted fair uses, both courts should
have begun by analyzing whether the uses were fair on their own
terms and then analyzed the proportion of Napster use that could
be characterized as sampling or space-shifting. Had the district
court and the appellate court used this approach, the ruling may
68. See Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1018.
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. See id. at 1019.
72. Id. (citing NapsterI, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 915-16).
73. See Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1019.
74. See id.
75. See id. at 1015-17; NapsterI, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 912-13.
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have better articulated the balance between the rights of copyright
owners and users that section 107 is intended to strike.
The discussion of sampling by both courts shares two flaws.
First, the definition of sampling appears to have been overinclusive,
sweeping in permanent downloads that do not result in a sale. 76
This definition suited Napster's needs because without it, Napster
would not have had a plausible argument that it was not liable for
its users' activities. But the definition gave short shrift to the rights
of conscientious Napster users who may have deleted files after de-
ciding not to purchase the music contained therein. Had sampling
been limited to those downloads that a user either keeps because
he or she has purchased the song(s) or deletes after having, within
a reasonable time, decided not to purchase the music, a strong ar-
gument can be made under the four factors of section 107 that
such use is a non-commercial use which does not harm the market
for music sales.77
Similarly, in its brief discussion of space-shifting, the Ninth Cir-
cuit did not squarely address whether it is a fair use to copy from a
remote source a music file containing recorded music that one
owns in another format. 78 Had discussion of space-shifting focused
on that issue, the answer again might have been that such copying
is fair. If either court had followed this suggested analytical frame-
work, Napster would not have been held immune from liability. Al-
most certainly the asserted fair uses do not characterize the
majority of downloads that have taken place on Napster. The dis-
trict court, for example, came to this conclusion with respect to
space-shifting. 79 The courts could have held that even though Nap-
ster facilitates some fair uses of recorded music, most users turn to
Napster's service for copyright infringement. Such a holding would
76. See Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1018.
77. The recording industry would likely counter that such use would still
harm the market for distribution of promotional copies and the still-undeveloped
market for rentals of digital music. Cf NapsterII, 239 F.3d at 1018 ("[E]ven author-
ized temporary downloading of individual songs is commercial in nature."). The
proper resolution of this dispute depends upon one's view of the harm-to-a-poten-
tial-market analysis under the fourth fair use factor.
78. The question of whether a user who requests a music file from remote
source is engaged in fair use is distinct from whether a service that makes and
distributes unauthorized copies for the purpose of serving as such a remote loca-
tion is engaged in fair use. See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.Com, Inc., 92 F.
Supp. 2d 349, 351-52 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (asking whether service that makes and dis-
tributes unauthorized copies for purpose of serving remote location is engaged in
fair use and rejecting fair use defense of such service).
79. See Napster I, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 916 (holding "[d]efendant fails to show
that space-shifting constitutes commercially significant use of Napster").
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have recognized the beneficial aspects of the technology while still
requiring analysis of whether Napster could be held liable for con-
tributory or vicarious infringement.
D. Third-Party Liability
The Ninth Circuit's analysis of contributory and vicarious lia-
bility is interesting and problematic on a number of levels. The
court's analysis, for example, could be seen as an attempt to address
the concerns of two important constituencies. As is well known, the
Ninth Circuit covers a number of western states, predominantly Cal-
ifornia. Two California constituencies had keen interests in this
case: (1) technology companies based in Northern California, and
(2) the entertainment industry based in Southern California. In its
discussion of contributory infringement, the Ninth Circuit went out
of its way to give some comfort to the manufacturers of new tech-
nologies.80 But any sense of comfort quickly evaporated after the
court announced its expansive understanding of vicarious liabil-
ity.81 As a result, the Ninth Circuit muddled the law.
1. Contributory Infringement
Liability under the doctrine of "contributory infringement" re-
quires that a third party have actual or constructive knowledge that
another is engaged in copyright infringement and that the third
party has induced, caused, or materially contributed to the other's
infringing conduct.8 2 The Ninth Circuit had little difficulty finding
that Napster materially contributed to the infringing activity of its
users by connecting its users through the distribution of Music-
Share and by the operation of the directory of users' files.8 3 Of
greater consequence, is the court's discussion of the knowledge re-
quirement. The plaintiffs provided evidence that Napster execu-
tives knew that users were engaged in copyright infringement.8 4
Accordingly, the plaintiffs argued that because MusicShare was de-
signed to facilitate copying of music files in the MP3 format, Nap-
ster should be held to know that users would use, and were using,
its software to make infringing copies of copyrighted music.8 5 In
response to the plaintiffs, the Ninth Circuit upheld the finding that
80. See Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1021-22.
81. See id. at 1023-24.
82. See id. at 1019-20.
83. See id. at 1022.
84. See Napster I, 239 F.3d at 1022 (citing Napster , 114 F. Supp. 2d at 918,
920-21 n.6).
85. See id. at 1021.
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Napster had actual knowledge of infringement; but it also analyzed
whether Napster had constructive knowledge of infringement.86
In attempting to deny constructive knowledge, Napster relied
on Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,87 which held that a manu-
facturer of a videocassette recorder does not have constructive
knowledge that its product is used for copyright infringement if the
product is capable of substantial non-infringing uses.88 Extending
the Supreme Court's holding in Sony, the Ninth Circuit held that
" [w] e ... will not impute the requisite level of knowledge to Nap-
ster merely because peer-to-peer file sharing technology may be
used to infringe plaintiffs' copyrights. '8 9 More importantly, the
Ninth Circuit held that Sony immunity from constructive knowledge
is based on a "system's capabilities," which in turn requires analysis
of current use and potential non-infringing uses.90
In an interesting move, the Ninth Circuit supported its holding
with analysis of Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Commu-
nication Services, Inc.,9 1 an earlier case involving the potential liabil-
ity of an Internet service provider and a bulletin board system
operator.92 The Ninth Circuit then restated and expanded its hold-
ing by declaring that "absent any specific information which identi-
fies infringing activity, a computer system operator cannot be liable
for contributory infringement merely because the structure of the
system allows for the exchange of copyrighted material. '93
In the first iteration of its holding, the Ninth Circuit extended
Sony immunity to "peer-to-peer file sharing technology." 94 Presum-
ably, this holding includes MusicShare, on the theory that the court
looked at a computer application as a software device similar to a
VCR. In its second iteration, however, the court's holding ex-
tended beyond a computer application to a complete system over
which infringing activity may take place. 95 This extension by the
Ninth Circuit favors one who constructs such a system; operating
such a system, however, is risky business indeed.
86. See id. at 1021-22.
87. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
88. See id. at 418.
89. Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1020-21 (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 436).
90. See id. at 1021.
91. 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
92. See id. at 1374.
93. Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1021 (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 436, 442-43).
94. Id. at 1020-21.
95. See id. at 1021-22.
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2. Vicarious Liability
The court's treatment of vicarious liability is the more impor-
tant aspect of the holding and the more worrisome piece for In-
ternet clients. Vicarious liability for copyright infringement is
imposed when a third party has the right and ability to supervise an
infringer's conduct and the third party receives a financial benefit
from the infringing conduct. 96 Because this is a judicial doctrine,
the standards for vicarious liability have been articulated through a
common law process. Vicarious liability in the common law tradi-
tion starts with the employer/employee relationship. 97 It is a basic
form of respondeat superior.98  It is based on the notion that if one
owns a business and employees acting within the scope of their em-
ployment are engaged in infringement, the owner will be held
liable.
The courts, however, split on the scope of vicarious liability in
other contexts. On one hand, a line of cases developed which said
that absentee landlords who rent property where infringement oc-
curs, such as a record store selling infringing phonorecords, will
not be held liable.99 In immunizing this type of absentee landlord
from liability, courts reasoned that even though the landlord might
have theoretical control over what is going on and might be getting
some benefit from the sales of infringing records (because it helps
keep the tenant solvent), such control and benefit is too tenuous to
impose liability.100 On the other hand, a separate line of cases, the
so-called "dance hall" cases, also developed. 10 1 Under these cases,
the operator of a dance hall would hire a band that would play
copyrighted songs without a license. Courts viewed the "dance hall"
cases as similar to the employer/employee relationship because the
dance hall owner can control the band and the owner receives a
financial benefit from the band playing the latest hits and drawing
people in to spend money at the club.
Any lawyer should understand the importance of analogies in
common law lawmaking. It may have been that the Ninth Circuit
96. See id. at 1022.
97. See, e.g., Sword v. NKC Hosps., Inc., 714 N.E.2d 142, 148 (Ind. 1999).
98. See Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1022 (citing Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction,
Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 262 (9th Cir. 1996), which discusses vicarious liability for copy-
right infringement).
99. See Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 262 (discussing background cases on vicarious lia-
bility for copyright infringement).
100. See id.
101. See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 437 n.18
(1984).
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would have had to reach back to some of these older cases to de-
cide whether Napster is more like an absentee landlord or like a
dance hall operator. Had these been the only available analogies,
Napster quite likely would have fallen on the "dance hall" side of
the divide; but the Ninth Circuit might also have explained what
the operator of a computer system must do to be treated as a mere
landlord. Instead, the Ninth Circuit relied heavily on Fonovisa, Inc.
v. Cherry Auction, Inc.,10 2 a recent case in which the Ninth Circuit
had held that the plaintiffs stated a claim for vicarious infringement
against the operator of a flea market at which bootlegged record-
ings were sold.1 03 Because of the procedural posture in that case,
the court was obliged to assume the worst about the flea market
operator. After reviewing the precedents just mentioned, the Ninth
Circuit held in Fonovisa that the flea market operator supervised the
distribution of infringing recordings because it had the right to
"control and patrol" its premises, along with a contractual right to
evict the vendors for any reason. 10 4 Further, the operator received
a financial benefit because it received revenue from the vendors
and patrons involved in the infringing distributions.1 0 5 To the
Ninth Circuit, Napster looked a lot like a flea market involving bar-
ter, rather than a cash exchange.1 0 6
In examining the supervision prong of vicarious liability, the
Ninth Circuit adopted a formalist stance. The court concluded that
Napster had the right to supervise its users because, in its Music-
Share license agreement, Napster had retained a right to refuse ser-
vice or terminate a user's account for any reason, including a belief
that a user is violating applicable law.10 7 The court held that "[t]o
escape imposition of vicarious liability, the reserved right to police
must be exercised to its fullest extent."10 8 The only silver lining for
102. 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996).
103. See id. at 264.
104. See id. at 262-63.
105. See id. at 263.
106. The analogy may have seemed particularly apt given that the author of
Fonovisa, then CircuitJudge Schroeder, was also a member of the Napster II panel.
See generally, Napster II 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); Napster I, 114 F. Supp. 2d
896 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
107. See Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1023-24; see also Charles S. Wright, Comment,
Actual Versus Legal Control: Reading Vicarious Liability for Copyright Infringement Into
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, 75 WASH. L. REV. 1005, 1013-18 (2000)
(discussing conflicting lines of authority concerning interpretation of control
prong of vicarious liability standard).
108. Napster I 239 F.3d at 1023. But see Artists Music v. Reed Publ'g, 31
U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1623, 1627 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding "mere fact that [trade
show organizer of show where infringing records were sold] could have policed
exhibitors at great expense is insufficient to impose vicarious liability").
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the technology community is that the court limited Napster's duty
to supervising user activity within the given architecture of the Nap-
ster system. 10 9 The Ninth Circuit determined that Napster's "right
to police" extended to searching the contents of its file directory
and terminating user accounts. 110 The court, however, did not ex-
plain how Napster was to police its file directory. Rather, the Ninth
Circuit left this matter to the district court.
With regard to the financial benefit prong, it is fair to ask:
"How does Napster make its money?" Right now Napster does not.
In fact, there are people who say: "Hey, look it's the Soviet Union
... it's going to collapse under its own weight - the business model
doesn't make sense." But in our attention economy, getting the
attention of fifty million registered users is something that you
probably can convert into money either through advertising or sub-
scriptions. In the short run, Napster had received substantial in-
vestment capital. Thus, the Ninth Circuit had little difficulty
finding that the availability of copyrighted music drew users to Nap-
ster and that Napster received a financial benefit from such in-
creases in its userbase. 111
3. Analysis
The Ninth Circuit's contributory infringement analysis is in
some tension with its vicarious liability analysis. It is possible to
build a system that enables infringing activity without being liable,
but as soon as you operate such a system, you must exercise your
supervisory authority to the "fullest extent" or you will be held
liable.
Without fanfare, the Ninth Circuit appears to have fashioned
new law under the doctrine of vicarious liability. The court held
that "[lt] o escape imposition of vicarious liability, the reserved right
to police must be exercised to its fullest extent. Turning a blind eye
to detectable acts of infringement for the sake of profit gives rise to
liability."1 12 These statements are doctrinally incoherent. As the
court had recognized, vicarious liability is an "outgrowth" of the
doctrine of respondeat superior.113 Like respondeat superior, vicari-
ous liability for copyright infringement turns on the relationship be-
109. See Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1023-24.
110. See id. at 1024.
111. See id. at 1023.
112. Id.
113. See id. at 1022 (citing Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259,
262 (9th Cir. 1996)).
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tween the defendant and the direct infringer. 14 Liability is strict
and no exception applies to the supervisory party who tries hard.'1 5
In the employer/employee relationship, for example, the employer
is strictly liable for the employee's infringing conduct regardless of
how carefully the employer supervises the employee. It is the power,
or exercise of the power, to supervise that gives rise to the imposi-
tion of strict liability.11 6
The policy for imposing strict liability for copyright infringe-
ment on supervisory parties is twofold. First, strict liability is to pro-
vide potential plaintiffs with greater assurance of receiving a
remedy by making the supervisory party the insurer of its
supervisees' infringing acts." 7 The plaintiff may not recover
doubly from the supervisor and the supervisee for the supervisee's
infringements, but the plaintiff may choose from which defendant
she may recover.'l 8
Second, the aim of vicarious liability is to provide an incentive
to supervisory parties to exercise their supervisory power respon-
sibly. At first blush, the imposition of strict liability is a disincentive
to careful supervision because the costs of careful supervision do
not yield the benefit of a defense to liability. In practice, however,
the specter of strict liability provides an incentive for the supervi-
sory party to exercise its power to reduce the incidence of infring-
ing acts for which it will be held strictly liable. 119 The incentive
114. See EZ-Tixz, Inc. v. Hit-Tix, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 728, 732-33 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(discussing various elements of liability).
115. See id. at 733 ("[T]here are only two elements of vicarious liability: (1)
the ability to control the infringer and (2) a financial interest in the infringing
activities.").
116. But seeBanff Ltd. v. Ltd., Inc., 869 F. Supp. 1103, 1109-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)
(requiring in addition to evidence of power to control some evidence of actual
control). "Given that the actual exercise of control cannot be presumed from the
mere power to control, it is logical to require evidence of actual control and super-
vision before holding the parent [corporation] liable [for the infringing acts of its
subsidiary]." See id.
117. See Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Winback & Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d
1421, 1440-41 n.21 (3d Cir. 1994) ("The purpose of the doctrine [of vicarious lia-
bility] is to prevent an entity that profits from infringement from hiding behind
undercapitalized 'dummy' operations when the copyright owner eventually sues.");
Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H. L. Green Co., 316 F. Supp. 304, 309 (2d Cir. 1963)
(stating that purpose of copyright advanced by placing risk of direct infringer's
insolvency on the supervisory party rather than copyright owner); Polygram Int'l
Pub., Inc. v. Nevada/TIG, Inc., 855 F. Supp. 1314, 1325 (D. Mass. 1994) (stating in
dicta that vicarious liability is a matter ofjudicial risk allocation of costs of infringe-
ment liability).
118. See 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 12.04[C][4] n.172.
119. See Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 316 F. Supp. at 308-09 ("Green has the power
to police carefully the conduct of its concessionaire Jalen; our judgment will simply
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justification for vicarious liability makes sense only when the super-
visory party's power to control the infringing behavior is such that it
can meaningfully reduce the incidence rate of infringing acts com-
mitted by its supervisees.
The purpose of vicarious liability, therefore, is to provide an
incentive for the supervisory party to police its supervisees "to the
fullest extent" that the supervisor deems efficient in light of its po-
tential liability for copyright infringement, but the insurance ratio-
nale provides that such policing does not immunize the supervisory
party from liability in the event that infringement occurs. Yet, the
Ninth Circuit appears to have announced that such immunity
would be available where a court determines that the supervisory
party has policed its supervisees to the "fullest extent."'120
Adding confusion to its vicarious liability analysis is the court's
statement that "[t]urning a blind eye to detectable acts of infringe-
ment for the sake of profit gives rise to liability."' 21 Under tradi-
tional vicarious liability analysis, the act of "turning a blind eye"
would be of no moment because it relates to the defendant's knowl-
edge. Constructive knowledge closes the loophole that would en-
courage willful ignorance were liability to turn on actual
knowledge. Constructive knowledge, however, applies to contribu-
tory infringement, not vicarious liability. The courts that have
drawn a clear doctrinal distinction between vicarious and contribu-
tory infringement have made clear that the supervisory party's lack
of knowledge of its supervisees' infringing activities, whether caused
by the supervisor's willful blindness or by the surreptitious actions
of crafty supervisees, is immaterial to the imposition of vicarious
liability.122
The Ninth Circuit's opinion poses a quandary for attorneys ad-
vising Internet-based clients about the risks of vicarious liability for
their users' infringing activities. Attorney and client should pro-
ceed cautiously if they intend to rely on the new safe harbor from
vicarious liability that the Ninth Circuit appears to have created. It
is possible that the court did not intend to create a safe harbor at
all. In subsequent cases, the court may choose to characterize its
encourage it to do so, thus placing responsibility where it can and should be effec-
tively exercised.").
120. See Napster II, 239 F.3d 1004, 1023-24 (9th Cir. 2001).
121. Id. at 1023.
122. See, e.g., Shapiro Bernstein & Co., 316 F.2d at 308 ("The imposition of lia-
bility upon the Green Company, even in the absence of an intention to infringe or
knowledge of infringement, is not unusual."); see also 3 NIMMER supra, note 118, at
§ 12.04[A] [1] & n.20 (collecting cases).
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offer of immunity to the supervisory party who fully supervises as
errant dicta. But there is some reason to believe that the court
meant what it said. The tone of the opinion, and the court's choice
to extend Sony's protections, evidence an attempt to fashion a com-
promise between the interests of the technology community and
the entertainment industry. In the spirit of compromise, the court
chose to cast the specter of vicarious liability quite wide across the
Internet by applying the doctrine to any system operator that re-
tains in its Terms of Service or other statement of policy a right to
exclude users from communicating with its servers. To offset the
sizable costs imposed by allocating the risks of liability so broadly,
the Ninth Circuit appears to have created a new exception to the
doctrine of vicarious liability available to third parties that exercise
the power to exclude copyright infringers to the fullest extent.
Finally, there is an interesting subtext involving doctrines of
real property, intellectual property and privacy in the evolution of
vicarious liability. In the traditional landlord-tenant case, courts
have held the landlord immune based, in part, on an understand-
ing of the relationship between landlords and tenants. 123 A lease-
hold is more than a contractual right; it is an interest in the real
property, an exclusive right to possess. That exclusive right pro-
vides the tenant with certain expectations of privacy, notwithstand-
ing a landlord's contractual right to enter the premises. Implicitly,
courts appeared to have recognized that imposing vicarious liability
on landlords would be undesirable both because most landlords do
not meddle in their tenants' business, and because imposing such
liability would effectively require landlords to so meddle. In Fo-
novisa, the district court accepted, and the Ninth Circuit rejected, a
view of the flea market vendors as tenants, with certain rights to
conduct their business as they saw fit within their assigned plot.
The Ninth Circuit was not persuaded by the analogy because the
swap meet operator, unlike a commercial landlord, retained a uni-
lateral right to evict for any reason, and, unlike many commercial
landlords, it actively patrolled its premises. Conceivably, the result
may have been different had the operator extended certain "prop-
erty" rights to the vendors. Such a different result may have devel-
oped because the rights in real property help establish an
expectation of privacy that is in conflict with the desire of the own-
123. See, e.g., 3 NIMMER supranote 118, at § 12.04[A][1] & n.23 ("[T]he lessor
of a theater is not liable merely by virtue of that status for infringing performances
that may occur in the theater.").
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ers of intellectual property who seek to impose liability on the
landlord.
The result in Napster I and Napster II would probably not have
been different had Napster constrained itself contractually from
terminating user accounts, or perhaps given users a role in manag-
ing the system. Such a result can be attributed to the disruption in
intellectual property markets caused by Napster's technology and
because real property metaphors are culturally less compelling
when the property involved is access to, and space on, computers.
But it may be that web hosts would have better luck analogizing
themselves to traditional landlords, particularly if the tenants ob-
tain property-like rights analogous to a traditional tenant's.
E. Statutory Defenses
Napster also asserted statutory defenses under the Audio
Home Recording Act and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
1. Audio Home Recording Act
First, Napster asserted the Audio Home Recording Act as a stat-
utory defense. The Ninth Circuit held that § 1008, a provision of a
1992 amendment to the Copyright Act that governs digital audi-
otape, did not shield Napster. 12 4 This provision immunizes the
manufacturer of a "digital audio recording device" or a "digital au-
dio recording medium" to the extent that such device or medium is
used noncommercially by consumers to make copies. 125 Relying on
its prior holding in Recording Industry Association of America v. Dia-
mond Multimedia Systems, Inc.,126 the Ninth Circuit held that per-
sonal computers are not "digital music recording devices" and that
computers do not make "digital music recordings."127
2. Digital Millennium Copyright Act
Napster's final statutory argument relied on Title II of the Digi-
tal Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA"). 128 Section 512 provides
limitations on monetary liability ("safe harbors") that are defined in
relation to the function performed by an online service provider in
124. See Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1024.
125. 17 U.S.C. § 1008 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
126. 180 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1999).
127. See Napster 1l, 239 F.3d at 1024-25 (citing Diamond Multimedia, 180 F.3d at
1077).
128. See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
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connection with the infringing activities. 129 Rather than relying on
the safe harbor established for service providers acting as search
engines, Napster argued that it was like a general backbone In-
ternet Service Provider who only makes copies by sending informa-
tion from point A to B and does not really pay attention to what is
happening.I3° The district court rejected this argument, and the
Ninth Circuit did not address it.131
The DMCA also provides a safe harbor for search engines. Sec-
tion 512(d) immunizes from monetary liability a "service provider"
that "links users to an online location containing infringing mate-
rial or infringing activity, by using information location tools, in-
cluding a directory, index, reference, pointer, or hypertext link."'1 32
That is precisely what Napster's MusicShare software does. Given
the facial applicability of the statute, one may ask why Napster did
not press, and the court did not decide, whether section 512(d)
applied to Napster. Moreover, section 512 is an Act of Congress,
fashioned through business-to-business negotiations, that was sup-
posed to serve as the blueprint for determining the rights and re-
sponsibilities of information intermediaries in the networked,
digital era. And, if the section had been found to apply, the Ninth
Circuit's discretion in instructing the trial court regarding injunc-
tive relief would have been greatly circumscribed. 133 Notwithstand-
129. See id.
130. See Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1025.
131. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 2000 WL 573136 at *8 (N.D. Cal.
May 12, 2000) ("Because Napster does not transmit, route, or provide connections
through its system, it has failed to demonstrate that it qualifies for the 512(a) safe
harbor."). See generally, Napster II, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
132. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(d). Section 512 defines "service provider" differently
depending upon which safe harbor subsection is at stake. For purposes of the
search engine safe harbor in subsection (d), a "service provider" is "a provider of
online services or network access, or the operator of facilities therefore." 17 U.S.C.
§ 512(k) (1) (B) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
133. If a service provider qualifies for the § 512(d) safe harbor from monetary
liability, the court may grant injunctive relief with respect to a service provider only
in one or more of the following forms: (i) An order restraining the service pro-
vider from providing access to infringing material or activity residing at a particu-
lar online site on the provider's system or network; (ii) An order restraining the
service provider from providing access to a subscriber or account holder of the
service provider's system or network who is engaging in infringing activity and is
identified in the order, by terminating the accounts of the subscriber or account
holder that are specified in the order; (iii) Such other injunctive relief as the court
may consider necessary to prevent or restrain infringement of copyrighted mate-
rial specified in the order of the court at a particular online location, if such relief
is the least burdensome to the service provider among the forms of relief compara-
bly effective for that purpose. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(j) (1) (A) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
Section 512(j) does not distinguish between the scope of preliminary and per-
manent injunctions. See 17 U.S.C. § 5120) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). One could
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ing the potentially outcome-determinative effect of section 512(d),
and the apparent intent of Congress to anticipate and legislate the
outcomes of cases such as this, the Ninth Circuit chose to defer
interpretation of Congress's resolution of issues such as those raised
in Napster and chose instead to rely on its common law approach to
the case.' 3 4
What is even more perplexing is that the decision regarding
section 512 would not have been particularly difficult - at least on
the surface. To qualify for section 512(d) protection, a service pro-
vider must act expeditiously to remove access to an online location
if the service provider has actual knowledge that the target material
is infringing or if the service provider becomes "aware of facts or
circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent."1 35 Had
the Ninth Circuit acknowledged the potential applicability of sec-
tion 512(d) when discussing contributory infringement, the court
would have held the safe harbor inapplicable for the same reason
that the court found contributory infringement - Napster had ac-
tual knowledge of infringing activity. 136
By avoiding adjudication of the section 512(d) issue, however,
the Ninth Circuit avoided a number of troubling interpretive issues
lurking in section 512, and this seems to have been the court's mo-
tivation for leaving section 512 jurisprudence undeveloped. The
source of much of the trouble is that the section 512 safe harbors
are limitations on liability, but it is not clear what theory of service
provider liability is being limited. For example, section 512 (d) pro-
vides a limitation on liability arising when the service provider
"links users to an online location containing infringing material or
infringing activity, by using information location tools, including a
argue that the subsection (j) limitations do not apply to preliminary injunctions
because the subsection limits relief only after the court has determined that the
"service provider is not subject to monetary remedies under this section." Id. If
that is the proper interpretation of subsection (j), then the Ninth Circuit was free
to leave for another day whether Napster would qualify for the § 512(d) limitation
on monetary liability.
134. See Napster I, 239 F.3d at 1025.
135. 17 U.S.C. § 512(d)(1)(A)-(C) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
136. See Napster I, 239 F.3d at 1020. Knowing that it was vulnerable to proof
of actual knowledge, Napster had urged that it fit within the § 512(a) safe harbor,
which applies even if the service provider has knowledge of infringement. See id. at
1025. Section 512(a) protects against monetary liability for infringement "by rea-
son of the provider's transmitting, routing, or providing connections for, material
through a system or network controlled or operated by or for the service provider."
17 U.S.C. § 512(a) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). In a separate opinion, the district court
had denied Napster's motion for summary judgment on its § 512(a) defense. See
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 2000 WL 573136 (N.D. Cal. May 12, 2000).
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directory, index, reference, pointer or hypertext link. ' 137 It is
highly doubtful that a service provider could be held liable as a di-
rect infringer for most linking activities.138 The more likely inter-
pretation is that Congress intended to limit liability for contributory
infringement. The language Congress chose, however, is in tension
with that intent. Section 512(d) is unavailable to a service provider
that has actual or constructive knowledge of infringing activity at
the target "online location."139 The knowledge provision poses the
possibility that section 512(d) is mere surplusage. If the only viable
theory of infringement that section 512(d) might limit is contribu-
tory infringement, then the plaintiff will have shown that a service
provider had actual or constructive knowledge of infringement.
But, if the plaintiff has made that showing, section 512(d) is un-
available, so it provides no limit at all. 140 Alternatively, there is one
level of knowledge applicable in order to make the service provider
contributorily liable, and another level of knowledge to limit that
liability under section 512(d). 141 Understandably, given the record
before the Ninth Circuit, the court chose not to engage in nuanced
analysis of issues such as these.
One last point on the Ninth Circuit's treatment of section 512:
The court made a very curious statement that plaintiffs had raised a
"serious question" as to "whether Napster is an Internet service pro-
vider as defined by 17 U.S.C. § 512(d).."142 The term "service pro-
vider" is not defined in section 512(d); the definition is in section
512(k) (1) (B). 143 And, it is hard to see what the "serious question"
is on this point. Under any reasonable interpretation, Napster un-
doubtedly provides "online services."1 44
137. 17 U.S.C. § 512(d) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
138. See 3 NIMMER, supra note 118, at § 12B.05 [A] [2] ("As to direct infringe-
ment, by contrast, it is not facially applicable."). But cf. Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp.,
280 F.3d 940, 947 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding liable a graphic search engine that
provided in-line links to plaintiffs copyrighted photographs).
139. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(d)(1).
140. Cf CoStar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 164 F. Supp.2d 688, 704 (D. Md.
2001) (stating that "the DMCA provides no safe harbor for vicarious infringement
because it codifies both elements of vicarious liability"). But cf. Napster II, 239 F.3d
at 1025 ("We do not agree that Napster's potential liability for contributory and
vicarious infringement renders the Digital Millennium Copyright Act inapplicable
per se.").
141. See CoStar, 164 F. Supp. 2d at 705 ("The determination of contributory
infringement liability turns on a different issue of knowledge than the standard
used to determine LoopNet's eligibility for the [§ 512(d)] safe harbor.").
142. Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1025.
143. For the text of § 512(k) (1) (B), see supra note 132.
144. See ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Comtys, Inc., 239 F.3d 619, 623 (4th Cir.
2001) (interpreting "service provider" in § 512(k) (1) (B) broadly); CoStar, 164 F.
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III. QUESTIONS FROM THE AUDIENCE
Attendee: Mike, what is the liability of the venture capitalists that
backed Napster?
Carroll: Good question. At this point, the venture capitalists ha-
ven't been sued, but, conceivably, under a theory of contributory
infringement you could say that supplying the money is a material
contribution to the infringement that's going on, and if you have
knowledge that you are funding infringing activity, you are liable.
Or, if the VC takes a control stake in the company, then the corpo-
rate form is no shield, and there's potential liability under a vicari-
ous infringement theory. There's a question in the back.
Attendee: [What about a Napster-like program that spreads like]
any virus that's out there, [if it is released by] somebody who is
obviously [not trying to] make money on the program?
Carroll: Well, that's one of the things, that's an interesting ques-
tion, and it depends on what the software does. Napster keeps an
ongoing relationship with you, so the court was able to find control
in the terms of that relationship. But if you create software in such a
way that you just put it out there, and you have no ongoing relation-
ship with people who use the software, or at least no relationship
that gives you control over users' infringing activities, then the cop-
yright owners will not be able to meet the control prong of that
standard. And again, the direct financial benefit - even under the
broad reading of that standard in this case - you're right. It's possi-
ble that a copyright owner could not meet this standard if the
programmer has adopted this "information wants to be free" ap-
proach to the program. Which is why there's going to have to be
some kind of solution, because even with the precedent established
in Napster, the recording industry has very slippery control over digi-
tal distribution of music at this point.
Attendee: Mike I think I can add further to that. . . you're asking
the question about you know if it doesn't make money - why is it
bad? Well, it's not just that ... that's only part of it. Maybe Napster
or companies like it don't make money by distributing music, but
who loses money are my clients and Ken's companies and his artists
Supp. 2d at 701; Hendrickson v. Ebay, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1087 (C.D. Cal.
2001) (same). Indeed, in the district court, the parties appear to have stipulated
that Napster was a "service provider" within the more limited definition of 17
U.S.C. § 512(k) (1) (A), although the court expressed some doubt upon this score.
See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 2000 WL 573136 *3 & n.5 (N.D. Cal. May
12, 2000).
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who make our livings by controlling distribution of this property
which we own.
Attendee: [What about the benefits of increased notoriety and no
reduction in] their sales [under Napster]?
Attendee: [Sales] should have gone up more ... they were diluted
severely by someone like Napster.
Carroll: Let mejustjump in and say, I think one of the problems is
that we don't really know the full economic story of what the effect
of Napster is. There's evidence going a lot of different ways.
Clearly there is sampling use, there's testimony to the effect that
people who sample music on Napster now get hooked on new mu-
sic and are spending more on music than they would have other-
wise. Or they're going out to see bands that they would not have
gone to see, or they're buying T-shirts . . . so there are a lot of
increases in revenue from other revenue streams. On the other
hand, there's pretty good evidence that some people are download-
ing and not buying music that they might have otherwise bought.
And again you've got the Metallicas out there in the world.
Even if you don't give them much sympathy, you've got the inde-
pendent musicians who are trying to self-publish, who see this new
cheap distribution channel becoming potentially useless to them
because all the music may get swept away immediately. So it's a very
complex economic story in terms of figuring out who wins and who
loses with Napster, and I think that's one of the problems, and one
of the things the court's opinion really wasn't as sensitive to as it
should have been. There's no recognition about how exciting this
technology is from the consumer's perspective in the opinion. It's
a very bare bones, dry application of legal doctrine to a very com-
plex new social and economic development.
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